sooo *ahem*
does anyone have any links to the role of the army in regards to the collapse of weimar?
i would say something along the lines of it had a considerable impact on relfecting the growing wariness of the german public toward the social, eco and political issues, but didn't really contribute...
(seeing as i know nothing of this topic, can someone help me out)
This is my stuff
The Seeckt Era
[FONT="] [/FONT][FONT="]He retained the army’s independence and power, even attended Cabinet meetings also attended by the President. This gave him direct access to power, a damaging situation for Weimar as Seeckt was never truly for the republic.[/FONT]
- [FONT="]Seeckt was an aristocrat with no respect for the WR and ‘he never attained a positive relationship to the republic and its institutions’ (Carsten)[/FONT][FONT="][/FONT]
§[FONT="] [/FONT][FONT="]During the 1950’s and 1960’s, historians such as
W.Sauer and F.L. Carsten emphasised the
‘state within a state’ concept, arguing that the autonomous position of the Reichswehr weakened the democratic order and contributed to the downfall of the Republic.[/FONT]
- [FONT="]Reduction of the Officer Corps created discontent within the Corps itself and led to failure to retain republican officers, meaning the officer corps was less prepared to make an unequivacol defence of the Republic against any Putsch from the right.[/FONT]
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- [FONT="]Hamburg Points:[/FONT][FONT="] introduced by the Central Council. If passed would mean the end of the old army. General Groener and the High Command threatened resignation and the end to the November 10 alliance between WR and army and pointed out to Ebert the inadequacy of his government, which depended on the army’s support. Groener showed the government ‘how indispensable the army was’ (F.L. Carsten, 1966). So the army kept its position and influence. [/FONT]
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ROLE OF THE ARMY – Historians opinions in general
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[FONT="]An alternative view:[/FONT][FONT="] from historians such as
H.T. Gordon and H.Meier-Welcher, claimed that Seeckt was loyal to the state and did much to consolidate the republican order. The Reichswehr had come to terms with the Republic, becoming a
‘republican by conviction if not by sentiment’, and would have remained so if the political leaders had shown some sympathy towards the armed forces and more understanding of Germany’s security needs.[/FONT]
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[FONT="]From the mid-[/FONT][FONT="]1970’s[/FONT][FONT="]: through the writings of historians such as
M.Geyer and A. Hilgrubber, a new perspective shifted interest from the Seeckt era to a period from 1926 onwards, when the army wanted to extend military influence, with the objective of creating a totalitarian military state.[/FONT]
- [FONT="]Kolb[/FONT][FONT="] sums up the impact of the army in the Weimar period in the following quote; “…the political aims and ambitions of the Reichswehr chiefs, and their consequent maneuvers in 1929-32, which were in no way forced by events, were factors of the first rank in the disruption of the Weimar republic.”[/FONT]