Your insistence on me begging the question is really quite annoying, either learn how to identify one, or stop accusing people of it.
But, we proceed:
Completely understandable, but then you would have to concede that it is false that there is no evidence for the existence of God.
I wouldn't conclude something was true just because it is uninteresting/I am lazy.
Alright then continue to provide claims that is not backed up by any evidence
Even though you know there are countless arguments for the existence of God, your willingness to go through only a few, and reject everything else, then to say that there is no evidence for the existence of God is a faith based opinion.
Which is a sort of thing your type of people despise.
Not at all, the creation of the universe is itself an active act, this act needs a will, and if something has a will, it is clearly alive.
I disagree, I think it it a 'passive' act, the result of unknowable forces in nature. You are claiming to know the basis upon which a transcendent force acts, or that this can be rationally deduced.
You are arguing that the cause of the universe is unintelligent and random, i.e. without a Will, it is simply the law of nature.
There have been many arguments proposed against such an assertion, over a personal Creator with a Will, one being:
The fact that the contingent thing is temporal, and comes from an eternal cause.
For instance, a man eternally sitting decides to stand up, this cannot be random since it could of happened since eternity past.
But because it happened 'now', it is clear that this cause is not random, has Will, and thus is Personal.
I just object to the whole unmoved mover argument. A rule is assumed that everything has a cause, including the universe. The most immediate and obvious reply is to ask, “But what caused God?”. The standard answer is, “Ah, but God has no cause, god is an exception to that rule”.
Yes God (capital G) is an exception to the rule, but you cut off the theist before he can explain why.
That is, since God is a Maximally Great Being that is Necessary, God must therefore necessarily be Eternal and without beginning.
Also, if we allow God to be a created entity, that is, contingent, then we must ask, what created it? If its another God, then we simply arrive at an infinite regress, therefore it cannot be created for it to be a God, this is as obvious as it can get.
So essentially, an entire layer of pointless complexity called God is invented and then declared to be an exception to the rule that everything has a cause. If you want to get into the game of deciding that there is no cause for the first cause, then it would be far simpler to simply decide that the universe itself has no cause, there is no need to invent additional and utterly pointless layers of complexity, especially when there is no credible objective evidence that can justify such a leap.
Indeed atheists have done that for centuries, like Bertrand Russel and Hume.
But in doing so they accepted the pre-eternity of the universe, since they believed the universe to be necessary and without cause. However the purpose of the Kalam argument (so your paragraph is in the wrong section), is to show that the universe DID begin, and thus is not necessary, and thus requires a necessary cause.
If you follow the proof through, we find that this cause is Necessary in being, meaning it must be Knowledgeable.
'The occasionalist argument', asserts but doesn't explain why the allegedly Necessary cause must have 'Will, Knowledge, Power, and be perfect'.
Since this Necessary cause is constantly creating, He must have Will to create, Knowledge and Power on how and the ability to create. Why these attributes are perfect (in the sense that they apply to all contingent things), has been explained already in the italics:
Poisiting that this Being is restricted only to the First contingent event [i.e. not perfect]
would disqualify this being from terminating the infinite regress of causes, since we would need to then posit another Entity in order to specify the application of His attributes to the first event and prevent them from applying to all others. In which case He is not the Entity we are talking about, since we need one which will terminate the infinite regresses of contingent causes. He would only be expanding the regress backwards further, not terminating it.
You have not tried to attack any of the premises either of this argument either
The 'defence of premise 2' assumes that causality applies to the entire universe, this is simply an assumption which we have no way of verifying. The author appeals to 'plausible' a synonym for 'probable', to something it's absurd to apply probability to.
To say that not everything that begins to exist has a cause, is to imply that things can pop into existence uncaused, meaning literally anything can come into existence uncaused, if we are able to compromise. We cannot observe this at all in any part of the universe, we must accept this as a metaphysical fact, to deny it would be a disastrous thing to concede. At the very least it is unscientific.
Predicting this objection, the author offers the alternative premise "The movement of my hand was not uncaused.", which commits the logical fallacy of begging the question, the conclusion of the argument is included in this premise.
It does not beg the question at all, clearly my hand had a cause, I can't say anything about this cause yet, but it had a cause, clearly.
If it does beg the question, please provide the assumption in my argument, in a quotation (so I can see the context), in which I can evaluate it. But I assure you there is none, the argument does not seek to prove that the movement of my hand is caused
Are you positing that me moving my hand had no cause behind it?
Proof Number 2: The Moral Argument
Communal is not the right word to use, but we say moral obligation does not exist, since moral obligation still exists even if you are not part of this 'community'. The point being however, is that the view of the 'community' or the 'majority' is no more authoritative, than that of the murderer.
The moral argument is hopeless. It's totally based on an absolute statement, summed up by "It should be clear that in our innate nature, there are values that we hold, that we hold to be objectively true.".
I had a great amount of writing dedicated to showing the absurdity of denying objective morality, please refer to my defense of Premise
He goes on to argue in regard to a hypothetical murderer "we affirm that they commit immoral acts", "Yet they (affirm they) are not committing immorality.", as though this is some logical contradiction and therefore disproves the notion that morality can be subjective.
I do not recall saying this, I have looked over my post and have not found it, please quote it for me.
In my defense of premise 2, of the objectivity of morality and the absurdity of subjectivist morality, I had given a 7 step logical argument with support, I do not understand why this has been ignored.
Again the authors premise begs the question. He asserts that a disagreement about morality must mean subjective morality is illogical (which assumes a conclusion of moral objectivity). But if subjective morality is true a disagreement it is not illogical.
I think the problem is his whole premise and definition of morality is different from someone like Sam Harris, and likely your definition of morality is different from mine. By 'definition of morality', I am speaking in reference to the word morality, and not the individual subjects within your personal/cultural moral framework.
I actually don't totally understand what his definition of morality might be, perhaps you could explain what it means to you?
Please quote where I have begged the question, with an explanation on how the conclusion is hidden in the premise. I need to know the context of this begging the question, rather than vague finger pointing.
This completely misses the point. So be it, murder is not a good survival trait, but that says nothing about the morality of the situation.
The authors statement is
"2) If morals are subjective to an unrestricted degree, we can conceive of a world where X is morally agreed upon
3) This is inconceivable"
Yet this is demonstrably wrong, as we can conceive a world where murder is morally agreed upon by groups of people.
This does not refute anything, my point in premise (2), is that we can conceive of a world where a moral wrong is agreed upon, it does nothing to say that we can also conceive a world where it is not agreed upon, so be it. Rather the argument is showing the absurdity of subjectivist morality.
Anthropic principle has been discredited completely. It completely misses the point of the fine-tuning, whether or not it is true, that we only observe fine tuning, says nothing to its actual fine tuning, since we can easily conceive of universes where they are not fine-tuned.
The fine-tuning argument depends upon the uniqueness of a universe that is fine tuned to support life. As you say, we can easily conceive that universes that are not fine-tuned to support life exist, as the author concedes a fine tuned universe could arise by chance, in a multiverse theory. If the multiverse theory were true, a finely tuned universe arising by chance, this would be a problem for the designed universe argument (as the author concedes). The author offers several poor objections to a multiverse theory, as follows:
'1. There is no empirical evidence to suggest the existence of multiverses' - All the authors proofs are mostly based on pure logic, rather than empiricism (for instance in proof number 1 where he assumes causality applies to the entire universe), so it's inconsistent and absurd to selectively demand empiricism is his wholly non-empirical argument.
But this argument specifically (the fine-tuning argument) is an argument that draws from empirical knowledge, so if you want to answer the fine-tuning problem with a scientific theory, please demonstrate its empirical evidence.
Your remark: "for instance in proof number 1 where he assumes causality applies to the entire universe"
Does not do anything to provide support for your argument against this point.
'2. This violates Occam's Razor.' - Occam's razor is a rule of thumb and not proof of anything. The more complex explanation is sometimes true. Regardless, how a multiverse relates to occams razor is debatable and contingent upon many things, in physics proponents of multiverse theory argue that, in terms of Kolmogorov complexity, the proposed multiverse is simpler than a single idiosyncratic universe.
I do not use it as proof, but rather supporting evidence. Nevertheless I am happy to concede on this point, I do not know enough about the intricacies of multiverse theory.
'3. There are problems with the level 2 Multiverse theory' - the author doesn't mention any.
Wait for it I literally address it the next line
'3*. The Christian philosopher Alvin Plantinga has proposed quite an ingenious problem philosophically for this universe. It is the Boltzmann Brains problem: A Boltzmann Brain is a hypothesized self awareness' - The author postulates Boltzmann Brain, as a problem for the theory of a universe finely tuned by chance. Fair enough.
He states: "It is vastly more probable that a universe containing a single Boltzmann brain would fluctuate into existence".
The thing about the Boltzmann Brain is that it applies equally as a philosophical problem for his conception of the universe (a designed reality, by a necessary creator) as it would for the alternative hypothesis (a finely tuned environment occurring by chance).
No it most certainly does not, it is only a problem for those who ask for some sort of random universe generator, not a Necessary creator who may wish to create a Boltzmann Brain, or not.
How does he explain why his observed universe, which could be the result of Boltzmann brain, is in fact not a Boltzmann Brain but is reality? Why is his model superior for explaining why we are not "stand-alone self-aware entities existing in a featureless thermodynamic soup"
He explains it in one sentence - "But we aren't Boltzmann brains!"
Insightful.
I quote William Lane Craig in my post, italicize the important bit, and call it important, being:
"The most probable observable world would be one in which a single brain fluctuates into existence out of the quantum vacuum and observes its otherwise empty world."
But we do not observe an empty world, indeed we actually observe an incredibly vast universe. So we cannot be a Boltzmann brain, but I'm suprised at your willingless to concede that you're a boltzmann brain, such a concession is analogous to believing in Solipsism. Itself leading to laughable absurdity.
No, the Hilbert's Hotel analogy is to show that the existence of an actual infinite in the physical world is ridiculous, which would then be a philosophical argument against the pre-eternity of the universe.
11th century Islamic Philosopher Al-Ghazali argued that only the infinite per se is impossible, arguing for the possibility of the infinite per accidens. 19th century Islamic Poet and Philosopher Muhammad Iqbal also claimed:
"A finite effect can give only a finite cause, or at most an infinite series of such causes. To finish the series at a certain point, and to elevate one member of the series to the dignity of an un-caused first cause, is to set at naught the very law of causation on which the whole argument proceeds."
I don't know the purpose of quoting such scholars, perhaps to try and accuse me of being heterodox?
Nevertheless, Muhammad Iqbal, although a great poet that he was, is not an authority in Islamic theology.
It also amazes me that you try to use Imam Ghazali to try and refute my conception of absurdity of an actual infinite in the physical world.
In his Incoherence of the Philosophers, Imam Ghazali refutes the Avincennan philosophers and charges them with
unbelief, (not merely heterodoxy), one of the reasons for his charge is because they believed in the pre-eternity of the universe.
You seem to misunderstand why the argument works for God, it is because God is Necessary in nature.
Whether you are a dog is contingent, it is true in some conceivable world, but not in others, so your parody argument fails in premise.
"Proof Number 6: The Modal Ontological Argument", again begs the questions, Point 5 asserts that god exists, but point 1 already depends upon god being 'Necessary', which is the same as saying point 5, so the intervening steps are redundant and in fact no explanation has taken place.
Amazing that you can call an argument devised by professional philosophers as begging the question.
Anyway, point 5 is not the same as saying point 1. In point 1, it is only asking for the possibility of whether God (capital G) exists, it does not assume God exists in the first place.
There is a heading, "Defense of Premise 1:", but it also assumes that god is Necessary, not whether it is possible that god is necessary.
How can we 'assume' that God is Necessary? God is defined as being Necessary, since that is really what we mean by God, if God was not necessary, than He is contingent, if He is contingent, He must come from somewhere, if He comes from somewhere, then what we are talking about really isn't God.
In fact premise 1, which states "It is possible God exists", could be changed to "it is certain God exists", and it would be the same statement (since the Necessary nature of god is being assumed)
Well to say 'it is certain God exists' is the conclusion, your thought process of going from It is possible, to it is actual, is exactly what the argument is, the fact that God, being Maximally Great, is Necessary in existence, must exist in all possible worlds, and therefore in our world too. What could be more intuitive than that?
For example, whether Goldbach's Conjecture is true, we cannot know whether it is possible or not that Goldbach's conjecture is true, since we cannot test an infinite amount of integers.
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Did you get someone else to write this for you, or are you simply fond of saying 'the author'?
