State building—whether organic or inorganic—is constrained by the economic base of the country. Somalia’s economy remains one of the poorest in the world. Its productivity is based mainly on pastoral nomadism and, in some regions, agriculture; both sectors are chiefly subsistence-oriented and profoundly impoverished. Somalia’s human development indicators are among the lowest as well. The country is heavily and increasingly dependent on remittances, which total between $500 million to $1 billion annually. Remittances have been the key to impressive growth in money transfer and telecommuni- cation companies, commercial imports of consumer goods, the transportation sector, real estate investment and housing construction, and a range of service industries. Nearly all of this economic growth and entrepreneurism occurs in the largest cities, worsening the urban-rural wealth gap in the country. The prolonged absence of a central government has meant that the private sector (and in some services, the nonprivate sector) is generally the only provider of what services are available in areas such as health care and education. The private sector has stepped into many of the functions normally associated with the state, operating seaports, airports, and local electric and piped water grids. Sectors where businesses either see no profit or are discouraged by problems of collective goods (e.g., road maintenance and public sanitation)—are immediately visible “market failures” that only a revived state authority can address. This “privatization of everything” in Somalia has also created a largely unregulated economy in which criminal economic activity (e.g., smuggling and drug production) flourishes.