princeza
PRINCZA
thanx for ur help people! probelm solved!! xox
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And Lib Humanism contextualised...http://employees.oneonta.edu/farberas/arth/arth200/LiberalHumanism.html said:Humanism and Literary Theory
This discussion is based on Chapter One, "Theory Before Theory," in Peter Barry's Beginning Theory: An Introduction to Literary and Cultural Theory" (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1995).
We began class by talking about what literature is, and how you know a piece of literature, as distinct from any other kind of writing. We then talked about what literature does, why one reads it, what one gets out of it; I made a list on the board of all the responses, and then began to talk about how "literature" moved from being something one read for pleasure to an academic field of study or type of knowledge.
Literary study began in Britain in 1840s, with the idea that the study of literature would "emancipate us from the notions and habits" of our own age, connecting us instead with what is "fixed and enduring"--the idea here is that literature holds timeless universal human truths (and hence can be read without regard to historical context of its production, and without regard to particular historical moment in which we read it and make meaning out of it).
The idea behind literary study was to secure middle-class values, to transmit them to all classes (working class as well as aristocracy) so that those values would indeed become universal.
The problem with studying lit at the university level initially was problem of defining HOW one studies lit. If the study of literature develops taste, educates sympathies, enlarges the mind, makes one a better human--how are those things measured? How can they be studied and assessed? At the end of the nineteenth century, in both England and America, as academics began to push for university courses in English and American literature, these questions arose. How could the study of literature be defined and carried out in a manner that was disciplined and objective enough to give it status as an academic pursuit (and not just "chatter about Shelley," as one critic put it--or as statements about what one likes or doesn't like in lit.)
This debate led, not only to the development of the first English departments, but to the development of the first types of literary theory, i.e., theories about how literature worked, what it did, and how it ought to be read and studied.`
There are two main tracks in literary theory. One begins with I.A. Richards' notion of "practical criticism," which we might call "close reading." This theory insisted that the best, and indeed the only, way to study literature was to study the text itself in close detail, and to disregard anything outside the text itself, including the author's biography, the historical context in which the work appeared, how it related to other works both before, during, and after its appearance, and how critics and readers responded to the text. In short, this branch of criticism theorized the literary text as an isolated object, something to be studied in and of itself alone. This is the theory that says what literature students ought to do is read the words on the page, and nothing else.
The second track in literary theory looks at the text as a key to understanding questions and ideas beyond the text itself. (This tradition is traced through Phillip Sidney, Wordsworth, and Henry James, among others). Rather than centering on the text alone, this track asks "big picture" questions: How are literary texts structured? How are they different from non-literary texts (if indeed they are)? How do literary texts affect audiences/readers (i.e. what does literature DO to you)? Is there such a thing as a specifically "literary" language, and if so, what is it like? How does literature relate to other aspects of a culture, such as politics, or gender relations, or philosophy, or economics? Theorists in this track use the literary text as a kind of springboard to ask questions that are not solely concerned with "the words on the page."
Current literary theory comes from both tracks. We begin by acknowledging that "the words on the page" are the basis for any analysis of any piece of literature--the raw material from which any argument or ideas must necessarily come. But the analysis rarely stops with close reading; that close reading shows us something, not only about the construction of the text, but about the author, the reader, the social contexts of both, and about the methods of interpretation available to authors and readers.
Both tracks, up until about the late 1960s, shared certain fundamental assumptions about what literature was, how it worked, how we read it, and why reading literature was important. We can sum up these assumptions in ten major points.
1. Good literature is of timeless significance.
2. The literary text contains its own meaning within itself.
3. (related to point 2): the best way to study the text is to study the words on the page, without any predefined agenda for what one wants to find there.
4. The text will reveal constants, universal truths, about human nature, because human nature itself is constant and unchanging. People are pretty much the same everywhere, in all ages and in all cultures.
5. The text can speak to the inner truths of each of us because our individuality, our "self," is something unique to each of us, something essential to our inner core. This inner essential self can and does transcend all external social forces (i.e. no matter what happens to me, I will always be me).
6. The purpose of literature is the enhancement of life and the propagation of humane values; on the other hand, literature should always be "disinterested," i.e. it should never have an overt agenda of trying to change someone (or it will become propaganda).
7. In a literary work, form and content are fused together, and are integral parts of each other.
8. A literary work is "sincere," meaning it is honest, true to experience and human nature, and thus can speak the truth about the human condition.
9. What is valuable in literature is that it shows us our true nature, and the true nature of society, without preaching (like point 6); it shows through drama, event, character, and conflict, rather than explaining, lecturing, or demonstrating.
10. What critics do is interpret the text (based largely on the words on the page) so that the reader can get more out of reading the text.
So far we're still on pretty familiar ground. What is going to be most striking, and most disturbing, about the kinds of literary theory you'll encounter this semester is how different most of them are from what you already know about how to read literature. The qualities of literature we've listed on the board--the timeless value, the secrets of human nature, the moral lessons literature teaches--all belong to a particular tradition in studying literature. Rather than just being "what one does" with literature, these ideas about the value of literature come from a particular perspective, which is generally called "liberal humanism" or just "humanism."
Liberal humanism started to lose its credibility in the late 1960s. What happened in the 1960s is pretty complicated, in terms of literary and social history. In a nutshell, literary critics responded to the social and political questions arising about race, gender, class, sexuality (etc.) by asking whether these timeless universal human truths found in lit. really were timeless and universal, or whether they weren't just as bound to race, class, gender, sexuality, and culture as everything else in the world. In other words, they started to ask questions like, is Shakespeare really "universal," or did he write as a white male in the 16th century? And if so, how did we come to read Shakespeare as "classic" and "timeless"?
Not everything prior to the 1960s fell under the heading of "humanism," however. In fact, many writers throughout the 20th century have questioned one or more of the basic assumptions of humanism, as have several schools of criticism and theory. Marxist criticism and psychoanalytic, for example, which pay attention to how social class and sexuality (respectively) function in producing literature, authors, readers, and particular kinds of interpretations, have challenged humanist principles consistently. What changed in the 1960s was that humanism became labeled as such, as a particular perspective or kind of theory of literature, rather than simply "the truth" about literature and how one approaches it.
The theory "boom" that occurred in the 1970s threw all of the humanist assumptions into question. The theories we'll be looking at this semester will strike you as alien and unfamiliar precisely because they throw out all the familiar ways we've learned to think about literature and about ourselves.
Just to start with: the theories we'll be reading have certain ideas in common. They include
1. The idea that things we have thought of as constant, including the notion of our own identity (gender identity, national identity, e.g.) are not stable and fixed, but rather are fluid, changing, unstable. Rather than being innate essences, these qualities of identity are "socially constructed." (A lot of the theories we'll be looking at are concerned with HOW such identities are constructed, and how they come to look and feel so stable and constant). Most of the theories we'll look at throw out the idea of there being anything absolute, especially any absolute truth, and instead focus on how everything is constructed and provisional.
2. Theorists also throw out the idea of objectivity, arguing that everything one thinks or does is in some degree the product of one's past experiences, one's beliefs, one's ideology. Where liberal humanists deny this, and insist they can look at a literary text with no preconceived notions of what they'll find, they are only masking their own ideological commitment. This idea relates back to the first idea, that truth is all a matter of perspective; this leads to the idea that thought and truth are all "relative," rather than absolute.
3. The theorists we'll read agree that language is the most important factor in shaping all our conceptions about life, ourselves, literary texts, and the world. Rather than language reflecting the "real world," language actually creates and structures our perceptions of "reality." Furthermore, rather than being speakers of language, these theorists hold that we are products of language.
4. Because all truths are relative, all supposedly "essential" constants are fluid, and language determines reality, these theorists conclude that there is no such thing as definitive meaning. There is only ambiguity, fluid meaning, multiple meaning, especially in a literary text.
5. Again, because of this idea of relativism, there is no such thing as a "total" theory, one which explains every aspect of some event. (Though of course this critique can circle back against each of the five points I've just named, which have been presented as if they were absolute, fixed, definite, and total).
Don't worry if this doesn't make sense to you yet, if your head is spinning after all this. Understanding these ideas is what this course is all about, and I don't expect you to know what's going on before the course has even started.
Don't worry too if you dislike all the ideas I've just gone over. Some people would point to the decline of the humanist perspective, and the rise of the modern theoretical perspective (with its insistence on relativism, ambiguity, multiplicity, etc.) as EXACTLY what's wrong with the world today. (If only we could return to the old-fashioned values, and believe in absolute truth, value, and permanence, they say, everything would be or at least a lot better than it is now). That's one of the questions we'll be looking at as we study these anti-humanist theorists this semester.
And with respect to DWM...http://employees.oneonta.edu/farberas/arth/arth200/LiberalHumanism.html said:I use the term 'liberal humanism' to denote the ruling assumptions, values and meanings of the modern epoch. Liberal humanism, laying claim to be both natural and universal, was produced in the interests of the bourgeois class which came to power in the second half of the seventeenth century. There are, of course, dangers in collapsing the historical specifities and the ideological differences of three centuries into a single term. Liberal humanism is not an unchanging, homogeneneous, unified essence, and the development, often contradictory, of the discourses and institutions which sustain it, deserves detailed analysis. But there are alternative dangers in a specificity which never risks generalization.....To find in Locke, for instance ... a liberalism and a humanism with still recognizable constitute elements of twentieth-century common sense is not to deny the importance of the specific location of Locke's texts in the 1690s on the one hand, or the subsequent and continuing debates and divisions within liberal humanism on the other....
/p.8 The common feature of liberal humanism, justifying the use of the single phrase, is a commitment to man , whose essence is freedom . Liberal humanism proposes that the subject is the free, unconstrained author of meaning and action, the origin of history. Unified, knowing, and autonomous, the human being seeks a political system which guarantees freedom of choice. Western liberal democracy, it claims, freely chosen, and thus evidently the unconstrained expression of human nature, was born in the seventeenth century with the emergence of the individual and the victory of constitutionalism in the consecutive English revolutions of the 1640s and 1688. But in the century since these views were established as self-evident, doubts have arisen concerning this reading of the past as the triumphant march of progress towards the moment when history levels off into the present. And from the new perspectives which have given rise to these doubts, both liberal humanism and the subject it produces appear to be an effect of a continuing history, rather than its culmination. The individual, it now seems, was not released at last from the heads of the people who had waited only for the peace and leisure to cultivate what lay ineluctably within them and within all of us. On the contrary, the liberal-humanism subject, /p.9 the product of a specific epoch and a specific class, was constructed in conflict and contradiction --with conflicting and contradictory consequences.
One of these contradictions is the inequality of freedom. While in theory all men are equal, men and women are not symmetrically defined. Man, the centre and hero of liberal humanism, was produced in contradistinction to the objects of his knowledge, and in terms of the relations of power in the economy and the state. Woman was produced contradistinction to man, and in terms of the relations of power in the family.
Finally, there is a great article written by Willaimson himself. I dont have the link but it can be found within this document of notes.http://www.lib.latrobe.edu.au/AHR/archive/Issue-July-1996/morris.html said:'The truth is out there...'
Meaghan Morris
© all rights reserved
On the possibility of free will and choice, Foucault explicitly tells us that they are mere illusions, and that the individual is merely the vehicle of whatever ideologies are controlling the unconscious.
David Willamson
My role -- and that is too emphatic a word -- is to show people that they are much freer than they feel ...
Michel Foucault 1
I've made a humiliating discovery. The world is full of people who believe in alien abductions, Satanic conspiracies, and the ineffable evil of government; people who believe that Aborigines are privileged in our society, and that minorities have too much power; people who believe that deconstruction caused 'Baa Baa Black Sheep' to be banned in English schools, and that Geoffrey Blainey and Leonie Kramer are "victims" of political correctness. Some people believe all of these things. I believe none of them. It's an X-Files world -- and, goddammit, I'm with Agent Scully.
In an X-Files world, the tiniest thing can push a seemingly normal person over the edge. Having watched with bemusement the sprouting of a thicket of screamingly weird propositions around my part of the academy -- "deconstruction junks truth!"; "literary theory kills author!"; "cultural studies smashes canon!"; "post-structuralists were Nazis!" and (a favourite) "postmoderns deny Holocaust!" -- my Agent Scully bullshit-alarm finally went off at the sight of a Sydney Morning Herald editorial (10/4/96) suggesting that "the structuralists" might have had a hand in Wayne Harrison's Sydney Theatre Company production of Heretic that so greatly displeased David Williamson.
That's right, structuralism -- the attempt in the 1950s and 1960s to develop a unified method for the humanities and social sciences by working out the implications for each discipline of a Saussurean model of language as rule-governed and profoundly social. The great structuralists -- Levi-Strauss, Greimas, Genette, the early Barthes -- saw themselves as scientists. They believed that society is intelligible, but they wanted to know how; they asked how we understand each other and ourselves. Taken up in the 1970s by the English-speaking world, French structuralism overlaps historically with existentialism; it peaked between 1960 and 1962, with a great debate about history between Sartre and Levi-Strauss.
While structuralism was as important for what it enabled as for what its exponents achieved, it has to be said that this particular bird is a very dead parrot. Yet there it is, flapping around in the Sydney Morning Herald, playing tricks with Margaret Mead (turning earnest anthropologists into blonde bombshells is a classic body-snatcher move), killing the author (again), and -- large as life, present tense -- promoting a "gospel" that the work of interpreters is "more important and creative than the text itself"
May I propose a brief reality check? For the moment, I leave aside the grossly silly polemics ("post-structuralists read Heidegger, Heidegger was a Nazi, therefore, post-structuralists are Nazis"). More interesting are those penned by Williamson himself, in articles as well as in Dead White Males and Heretic. His polemics have a serious intent, and they do try to engage with what academics are saying. Let me share that sense of engagement. To commit the sin of comparing apples and oranges (a critical activity that often offends Australian artists): I admire Williamson's plays as I admire the novels of Eleanor Dark and Sumner Locke Elliott -- they imaginatively enhance Australian life. I also enjoy his plays of ideas as I enjoy Michael Crichton's novels (Rising Sun, Disclosure). They bring out people's anxieties about social and cultural change, and encourage us all to talk about them. I even agree with Williamson that the "recriminations of identity politics" (The Weekend Australian 11-12/5/96) do little to combat poverty and social inequity, and may well do harm.
However, many "post-structuralists" would agree with him about that. There's the rub.
In Dead White Males, William Shakespeare says of the "feminist multiculturalist" villain, "that prattling knave Swain speaks through his fundament". Shakespeare is not wrong. Grant Swain talks a lot about "Foucault", but he has Foucault confused with Barthes, Barthes confused with British "cultural materialism" (the real source of his jargon, as the book of the play makes clear), and Foucault himself back to front.
For example, Swain has Foucault exposing "the way in which concepts of liberal humanist 'ethical responsibility' are used to prevent the expression of jouissance in every structured organisation". On the contrary; insofar as he talked about jouissance at all (that's Barthes on the thrill of reading, not Foucault on libido, as Swain does remember at one point), Foucault asked why we say we are prevented from expressing sexuality when institutions have invited us to talk about sex for centuries.
Foucault did not sneer at ethical responsibility. His last two books were on ethics. Foucault did not wage war on "liberal humanism", that's largely a British thing. He was sympathetic to the reinvention of liberalism, and outraged the PC forces of his day by taking seriously the neo-liberal critique of the welfare state. He was "anti-humanist", but that means that he rejected Descartes as a useful point of departure for thought in the modern world; he did not despise sociality or hold human initiative in contempt. And, unlike Swain, Foucault never ranted against "patriarchal corporate ideology". For one thing, he was a happily Eurocentric white male who was uneasy with women and ambivalent about feminism. For another, he did not believe in the existence of ideology.
There's something po-faced about arguing with a fictional character; I feel like Dan Quayle reproving Murphy Brown. I've heard it said that because Swain is a comic creation, clearly intended to come across as a charlatan, we can't attribute his views to Williamson. The difficulty is that nothing whatsoever in the play suggests that we can't attribute Swain's views to Foucault. The vast majority of Williamson's audience do not have Foucault at their fingertips, and I'd bet that Swain's is the only version that many will encounter.
Does this matter? I think so, if the play is to be taken seriously as part of a debate. The problem of its accuracy is compounded by Williamson's own recent claims. In the Bulletin article (2/4/96) from which I quoted at the beginning, he attributes to Foucault the very determinism, "ideologies ... controlling the unconscious", that Foucault spent his whole life fighting. In fact, one way of understanding post- structuralism is as a renewed insistence on the role of agency -- freedom, responsibility and creativity -- in "structuring" social life. Like Derek Freeman in Heretic, post-structuralism assumes that human beings are not blank slates or endlessly malleable plasticine; that is Saussure's legacy. Like Margaret Mead, however, it also cares about how sociable human beings can act to better their lives.
Williamson makes his "Foucault" do a lot of work. Most recently (The Weekend Australian 11-12/5/96) he turns up as an exponent of US-style identity politics, not only declaring truth a white male myth (when the truth is that Foucault wrote copiously about what makes truths true) but now declaring that politics can only be small-scale and "local"when the truth is that Foucault, angered by exactly this misreading of his History of Sexuality, spent years lecturing on the history and the efficacy of modern "governmentality".
In media contexts where academic evidence -- extensive quotations and footnotes -- is out of the question, this kind of tit-for-tat, 'tis/'tisn't, exchange can go on indefinitely. The trickiest issues arise, therefore, when a polemicist wants to admit the grain of truth in what their opponent says. This is often Williamson's stated desire, and here it's mine. In his pieces around Heretic, Williamson seems to suggest that post-structuralism is a form of social constructivism. He uses the tag "there is no human nature" to convert the claim that social conventions vary from culture to culture (a mundane belief shared by post-structuralism with a dozen other philosophies) into a claim that biology plays no role in human life.
A few of the innumerable bad cribs on post-structuralism do say something like this, and it's silly on at least three scores. First, from the proposition that many things we take to be natural are, in fact, historical, it concludes that there is no such thing as nature; this is a non sequitur. Second, it forgets the crucial role that psychoanalysis plays in post-structuralist thought; the work of Lacan, for example, is all about what happens when the biological is forced to become the social. Third, it ignores the fact that "post-structuralist" feminism emphasises sexual difference, not the sameness of the sexes. That's why equality-oriented feminists don't like it very much (neither do I, but that's another story) and why academic bookshops are bursting with feminist books about the body.
Mostly, primers on post-structuralism make none of these mistakes; they simply overwork the word "construct", along with other Latinisms inherited from the translation-ese of the 1970s. French is a Romance language; construire usually just means "to make". From which I derive Scully's First Law of Interpretation: saying "construction" does not make you a constructivist, any more than talking about "structure" makes you a structuralist.
Why is there so much exaggeration, hyperbole and panic around these once esoteric debates? There are many hypotheses in the air, some of them remarking that most (but not all) of the extremism in Australia is coming from "1960s people", the 50-somethings of today, who dismissed critical theory twenty years ago as a passing fad, and who are finding -- more thanks to John Dawkins than Michel Foucault -- that the intellectual world they grew up in has vanished
I've heard that in the US there is a Society for the Abolition of The 1960s In Our Lifetime. As for me, I'm founding the Agent Scully League For the Defence of Reasonable Argument. I haven't written a manifesto yet, but I'm working on the following protocol for the guidance of people who'd like to join:
1. When asked "have you stopped beating your wife?", on no account reply, "you mean, 'your spouse"'. The best response for men as well as women is, "hey! I am a wife!"
2. There are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in your philosophy.
3. It is unfair to compare apples and oranges if the topic of discussion is "apples", and you attack an orange for failing to be an apple, or an orange-grower for denying the reality of apples. However, it is perfectly reasonable to compare apples and oranges when your topic of discussion is "fruit".